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ABSTRACT
Four years after the United Kingdom’s (UK) referendum to leave the European
Union (EU), many questions remain, especially about the mechanics of the so-called
“Brexit.” However, there is a general lack of media discussion about the effects of the
Brexit on Scotland, who voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU, and two years prior
to the EU referendum, Scotland voted to remain in the United Kingdom by a small
margin. One of the main arguments for remaining in the UK was that there was doubt
that Scotland could join the EU after leaving the UK. The research question for this
project is, “What are the possible paths forward for Scotland in a post-Brexit future? And
how likely are these options?”
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
How will Brexit impact Scotland, and what are the possible futures for Scotland?
The 2016 European Union referendum (known colloquially as “Brexit”) in the United
Kingdom has ramifications all over the world, but what it could mean for Scotland is an
interesting question that has gripped the public and academic debates for four years. The
referendum was a basic majoritarian vote, despite the Scottish National Party (SNP)
proposing a referendum that was majoritarian U.K.-wide but also had a majority of
“leave” votes in each nation in order to trigger Article 50 and withdraw from the
European Union. 54% of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, but
62.0% of Scotland and 55.8% of Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European
Union. Even though Brexit was a non-binding referendum that only half of the four
nations voter for, and that Scotland and Ireland are not only opposed to, but ardently so,
the United Kingdom decided to trigger Article 50, the mechanism in the European Union
by which a member state can start the process to leave the union.
So the question continues, why Scotland, and not Northern Ireland? What is so
important that an entire thesis needs to be spent on a small portion of an island all the
way across the Atlantic? What impact does Brexit even have on the world?

1

Northern Ireland’s situation is a bit more complicated than Scotland’s. In part, the
complication comes from the fact that not only did Northern Ireland vote to remain in the
European Union by a smaller margin than Scotland, but should Northern Ireland secede,
they have to face the addition question of whether or not they would join the Republic of
Ireland or try to form their own state. Scotland, however, does not have a Scottish state
that they can contemplate joining or not. This is additionally complicated, since the
Republic of Ireland is an E.U. member state, so they would be able to enjoy member state
status, whereas it is not clear whether or not Scotland would be able to join the E.U.
Additionally, a bloody history between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
leading back to the Irish Civil War in the early twentieth century, as well as historical
religious divisions between the north and south of the island continue in the memories of
both. Whatever happens to Scotland will have ramifications for not only one of the
United States’ key allies and trading partners, the United Kingdom, but also on the
European Union. There is no precedent for a former region of an E.U. member state
joining the E.U. after independence, and if Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom
and attempts to join the European Union, their success or failure to enter the E.U. will set
international precedent going forward. This will have economic ramifications for both the
United Kingdom and the European Union. Scotland controls much of the United
Kingdom’s agricultural economy, so if they secede, that would change the trade needs of
the United Kingdom. This issue has been a continual point of debate. One of the key
arguments for Scotland to stay in the United Kingdom during the 2014 Scottish
independence referendum was that if Scotland left the United Kingdom, that would mean
that they would have to leave the European Union.
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Scotland is a topic of discussion and serves as example of how Brexit impacts the
United Kingdom as a whole. As such, over the years, the discourse on Scotland has
developed, into the two spheres of discourse, academic and public. The academic debate
is centered around how Scotland could avoid leaving the European Union, and this could
help explain the results of the EU referendum. The public debate is mostly about the
economic ramifications of Brexit to Scotland. These two debates occur simultaneously,
but mostly separately, orbiting around each other.
This thesis aims to outline the two spheres of debate, academic and public, and
what the debates can tell interested audiences about Scotland’s future in a post-Brexit
world. To do this, one must review the current literature and then extrapolate the findings
of that review into feasible outcomes for Scotland, and how likely they are to achieve
each outcome. The primary research question of this thesis is what are the most probably
futures for Scotland in light of Brexit? These futures will be determined after a review of
the academic and news debates regarding various topics related to Brexit and Scotland.
As such, it is incumbent to engage with an extensive literature review that provides an
analysis of the two spheres of debate: academic and public.
The field is in need of more extensive literature reviews and meta-analyses, since
the literature covers such disparate topics.
These topics include possible futures for Scotland; for example, Fletcher and
Zahn (2017) write about their interpretations of what could happen to Scotland in light of
a Brexit. In the literature that follows, the three most probable futures for Scotland will be
examined in a comprehensive manner, weighing obstacles and advantages of each
possible future.
3

Much of the literature entertains the question of whether Brexit will happen at all.
The finality of Brexit is not guaranteed, as it is not only a non-binding referendum, but
the time limit specified under Article 50, which allows for a member state to leave the
European Union, is two years, which the United Kingdom has already exceeded. Plus,
since Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland are all adamantly against
the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, leaving the E.U. could complicate
relations with the Republic of Ireland or trigger secessionist actions from Northern
Ireland and Scotland. The following review begins with an examination of literature
regarding the questions surrounding the larger Brexit issues. While this literature is not as
all-encompassing as is needed, it is a first step in tying the different subtopics together.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In 2016, the United
Kingdom (UK) held a referendum
on whether to remain or leave the
European Union (EU) in an event
that was colloquially deemed
“Brexit.” “Brexit” refers to both
the vote and the event of the UK
leaving the EU. Following a
surprising “Leave” result, the UK
is now in negotiations to leave the
E.U., but not every nation voted
to leave the E.U. In fact, the only
nations within the United
Kingdom that had a majority
vote to leave the E.U. were
England and Wales. However,

Fig. 1: How Did Your Area Vote? The electoral
results of the 2016 EU referendum by region.
(Map by Statistica. In “EU referendum: How did
your area vote?”, The Week, June 24 2016.)

due to other factors, the nation most likely to attempt to secede from the U.K. is Scotland.
First, some terminology requires defining, as the key players and events of Brexit are the
United Kingdom and Scotland. Electorally, Scotland voted 62% (The Week 2016) to
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remain in the European Union (which can be seen in Figure 1, from Statistica for the
publication The Week), which has led to tensions between the nation of Scotland and the
state of the United Kingdom. In this usage, “nation” refers to a group of people (often
associated with a territory) with a common identity, language, and/or culture; “state”
refers to the government that has coercive power over the members of that nation. Often,
states and nations coexist, but there are stateless nations (e.g. Kurdistan) and multinational states (e.g. Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom). Euroscepticism, which be
discussed in greater detail in later paragraphs, is the apprehension of being a part of
Europe. It must also be stated for an American audience that constitutional law
discussions in the U.K. happen in a fashion that is fundamentally different than how those
same discussions happen in the United States since the United Kingdom has no written
constitution.
The stunning unpopularity of Brexit in Scotland has led to widespread debate over
the likelihood of Scottish secession. However, many of the reasons why Scotland would
leave the UK is to preserve its relationship with the E.U., but it is unclear whether or not
the E.U. will accept Scotland as a new member state (Fletcher and Zahn 2017). While
Scottish secession is improbable for various social, economic, and political reasons, the
possible threat of secession is likely enough to be a valuable bargaining tool for the
Scottish government to pressure the central government into meeting their demands
during the Brexit negotiations.
The literature that was reviewed fell into two distinct categories: the academic and
public debate. The academic debate usually had a more theoretical focus and gets into the
specifics of topics like the legal options that Scotland has, about Scotland’s cultural
6

identity, and how much closer it is to Europe than the United Kingdom. Table 1 explains
this breadth of topic in the academic arena.
One thing that must be noted about the academic debate is that it varies wildly by
subtopic. The public debate is very cohesive, but the academic one ranges from
constitutional law to cultural connections to Scottish nationalism. The major failing in the
current research is that it’s discombobulated, often with authors claiming that they are the
only ones writing about Scotland or this very specific subtopic in regard to Scotland and
Brexit. While they may technically be one of the few authors discussing that specific
subtopic, there is a small academic debate about Scotland post-Brexit.
Normally, geographic distance or a language barrier between researchers might
account for some of the lack of communication, but much of the research done on
Scotland has been either written by Scottish authors or at the very least published by
Scottish or British universities. In this case, the lack of communication between authors
can be attributed to their tendencies to focus on very niche subtopics that indeed seldom
other authors are writing about. The field is in grave need of more meta-analyses.
The majority of the literature on the United Kingdom after Brexit is equally as
diverse in subtopic as the literature is about Scotland. It covers everything from to the
international affairs of a post-Brexit world to the impact it will have on European
languages to environmental and economic concerns about a not only a post-Brexit United
Kingdom, but a post-Brexit world. Some of these pieces will be included in this analysis,
but the broader academic debate about Brexit and the European Union is equally as
disjointed and veering into wildly different subtopics, although there are a few articles
that are commentaries on other works. This means that at least some authors are aware
7

that some other authors are writing about the European Union and Brexit.
The public debate is, in comparison, extremely concise in sticking to the issues that
citizens and politicians identify, instead of issues identified by academics. This is going
to annoy some, as Rahmatian (2018) laments that that academia is wholly absent from the
public debate. The main two issues discussed in the public debate are the economic
fallout of Brexit and the struggle of power that would ensue between the Scottish and
British Parliaments. Clearly, the public debate does focus on certain issues, unlike the
academic debate, which is diverse. There are some variations, like the 2017 BBC, which
was about the international relations of a post- Brexit Scotland, but most news articles
focus on either political tensions or the economy.
Before the discussion on the literature about Scotland, this is a quick review of the
state of the literature on the United Kingdom and Brexit. White and Barnett (2018)
respond to a proposal for a constitutional convention as a result of a lack of a strong sense
of identity throughout the United Kingdom. They also mention a lack of understanding
that some people have about what exactly Scottish nationalism entails (White and Barnett
2018: 591). Sacerdoti (2017) writes about how the U.K. wants to pursue free trade with
the European Union, but the
E.U. is not prioritizing that on their side of the negotiations (Sacerdoti 2017: 3).
Ham explores the forum non conveniens doctrine, the ability to “decline jurisdiction and
dismiss cases in favor of a more convenient and appropriate forum,” in British law (Ham
2020: 720).
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Table 1: The Academic Debate
Author
(Year)

Glencross
(2015)

MacKenzie
(2016)

Focus

Euroscepticism and
Scottish
independence (555).

The cultural
history of
Scottish
identity and
the Scottish
people.

Main
Points

Journal

McHarg and
Mitchell
(2017)

Scottish
identity has
changed, as
evident in the
change in the
results of the
1975 EU
referendum
(Scotland
voted to stay)
and the 2016
EU
referendum.
The article
A seafaring
Changes in
predicts
nation due to constitutional
law theories
that the
poverty at
over the years
result of
home and
has
the 2016
the
vote will
geography of changed
exacerbate
Scotland’s
Scotland
tensions
(577). Due to views of how
surrounding this history,
they can best
both
negotiate with
Scots have
Eurosceptic- lived all
the EU, but
ism and
across Europe time has not
Scottish
and are more changed their
independconnected to desire to be
ence (555). European
involved in the
EU.
identity than
British or
English
identity.
The
The Round
The British
Political
Table
Journal of
Quarterly
Politics and
International
Relations

McCorkindale
(2016)

Vidmar
(2018)

Fletcher
and Zahn
(2017)

The tensions
between
constitutionally understanding the UK as
a unitary state
or a union.

International
treaty law

The different
options that
Scotland can
pursue
following the
referendum
and their
consequences.

The source of
the ongoing
tensions
between the
UK and its
nations
is caused by an
evolving
understanding of
the type of state
the UK should
become in the
future and what
it is today.

This details
the conflict
between
international treaty law
and
constitutional
law. It also
details the
mechanisms
through
which the UK
can legally
leave the EU.

All of the
options put
Scotland in a
delicate
position after
the referendum
vote that calls
into question
many issues
with
constitutional
and
international
treaty law.

King’s Law
Journal

Wisconsin
International Law
Journal

The
Edinburgh
Law Review

Vidmar’s 2018 article is a good place to start with the literature, since it goes well
with Fletcher and Zahn (2017). Vidmar (2018) details the specifics of the legality of
Brexit in accordance with international treaty law, and Fletcher and Zahn (2017) also
employ arguments about constitutional and international treaty law when explaining the
options that Scotland could pursue. Vidmar “seeks to define the exact legal meaning of
Brexit and its consequences” (2018: 429) in more technical terms than other authors do
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and is the most descriptive of various aspects of EU law. This is the only work cited that
is from an American publication.
Fletcher and Zahn also discuss aspects of EU law throughout their article (2017:
98-103), but they focus on the specific set of options that Scotland has in response to
Brexit, and how international treaty and constitutional law effects the probability of those
outcomes. Fletcher and Zahn claim that the three options that Scotland has are as follows:
1) to secede from the UK, 2) to secede from the UK and seek EU membership
independent of the UK, 3) to stay in the UK and try to independently negotiate treaties
with the EU to try to make the best of the situation (2017: 98-103). While Vidmar (2018)
is more detailed in his discussion of specific EU laws that pertain to the UK in this
situation, Fletcher and Zahn (2017) are employs arguments with greater clarity that are
formatted in a way that is easier for someone without a background in international law
to understand.
McHarg and Mitchell (2017) explain debates within constitutional law in a way
that gives support partially to Fletcher and Zahn's third option for Scotland. In the 1975
EU referendum, Scotland voted to leave the EU, while the opposite result occurred in the
2016 referendum (2017: 512-513). McHarg and Mitchell describe the change as a result
of a change in perception of how Scotland could best negotiate with the EU (McHarg and
Mitchell, 2017:512). Scottish discourse in 2016 also looked different than English
political discourse.
In 2016, by contrast, Scotland produced the strongest Remain vote of
any area in the United Kingdom (Gibraltar excepted), and each Scottish
local authority area also voted to Remain. Although the Scottish
National Party (SNP) had supported withdrawal in the 1970s, by 2016,
no major Scottish party, including the Scottish Conservatives—and
10

indeed, no major Scottish politician—was in favour of this position.
Euro-scepticism [sic] was simply not a significant feature of Scottish
political debate, with the UK Independent Party (UKIP) consistently
recording its lowest levels of electoral support in Scotland. (McHarg
and Mitchell 2017: 513).
McHarg and Mitchell introduce the idea that Euroscepticism is not a facet of political
discourse in Scotland today. Glencross (2015) agrees with this, by asserting that
Euroscepticism is an idea that has not really permeated Scotland and equivocates
Euroscepticism to Scottish nationalism (555). Glencross goes further than McHarg and
Mitchell and calls Scottish nationalism an alternative to Westminster’s neoliberalism, and
emphasizes the political power of Scottish labor union workers (2015: 559).
Glencross (2015) makes the argument that “euroscepticism [sic] and Scottish
independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic
policy,” (Glencross, 2015: 555). Glencross also predicted that the then-upcoming
referendum vote would intensify the two debates. Glencross frames the debate as Scottish
attempts to interrupt the spread of the Euroskeptics’ underlying neoliberalism (2015:
555). This article was written after the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum and
before the 2016 EU referendum, so naturally it focuses more on the former than the latter.
MacKenzie’s 2016 essay is unique amongst all of the other works cited because it
does not focus on politics or international law at first, but rather on the cultural history of
the Scottish people. Towards the end of the article, he uses the foundation that he laid
about the Scots to explain the EU referendum. For geographic and economic reasons, the
Scots have always been a seafaring people, and that trade has spread Scots all over
Europe (MacKenzie, 2016: 577-578). For this reason, “Scottish identity has been much
more closely bound up with Europe than that of the English. Hence, it was no surprise to
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ﬁnd that Scottish voting practices in the referendum of 23 June 2016 were so strikingly
different from those of the English and the Welsh,” (MacKenzie, 2016: 578).
McCorkindale (2016) frames this issue as being caused by “an internal and
uneasy tension between its unitary and union state identities” (McCorkindale, 2016: 354).
Within this context, a union is a state that has a national government and devolved
powers with their own unique powers, like the United States of America. A unitary state
may have devolved powers but almost all of the power lies in the unitary government.
While the United Kingdom is a unitary state, the nations within the UK (especially
Scotland) have been granted more power and want more of a vital decision-making role
in the Brexit negotiations than the UK is willing to give them (McCorkindale, 2016: 355356). White and Barnett (2018) discusses a proposal for a constitutional convention, and
it touches on this same type of tension in identity; the premise for the call for a
constitutional convention is based on the need for the formation of a united identity.
Other academic articles are not included in Table 1. Rahmatian (2018), like
McCorkindale, discusses the constitutional restrictions that would limit Scotland’s postBrexit options. Rahmatian makes the critique that academia has been absent from the
public debate on the subject (2018). Rahmatian also argues that many of the pro-Brexit
arguments misunderstood the European Union as an institution that was primarily
designed to prevent war through the integration of economic markets (Rahmatian 2018).
Rahmatian notes that Scots worry that the xenophobic sentiment that was evoked in the
pro-Brexit could be used against ethnic Scots because they are not English. This
compliments MacKenzie’s arguments that Scotland has a closer shared history with
Europe than England (MacKenzie 2016).
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The public debate found in the newspapers is mostly focused on the views of
politicians, but there is a great amount of information on what average Scots think about
Brexit and what their options are in that respect does exist. The public debate has a more
limited scope than the academic debate. Table 2 provides a visual representation of the
scope of the debate.
Table 2: The Public Debate
Author (Year) Sim (2018)

Smith
(2018)
Focus
Political
Political
disagreeme
disagreemen
nt between
t between
the Scottish the Scottish
regional
regional
Parliament
Parliament
and the
and the
British
British
Parliament. Parliament.
Main Points/ This is
The
Developments about the
Scottish
separation
Parliament
of powers
rejects the
between
Brexit
the central
deal.
and local
While the
authorities, U.K.
Parliament
and power
can
struggles
overrule
like this
this
have
decision,
increased
after the EU but it would
referendum. cause
political
problems.
Publication
BBC
BBC

Rampen (2016) Dann
(2017)
Economic
Agricultural
fallout of
funding.
Brexit.

No author
(2020)
Immigratio
n

Treanor
(2017)
Economic
issues.

This was
written right
after
The EU
referendum.
Poor areas
voted to
leave the
EU, even
though the
majority of
Scotland voted
overwhelmingly
to stay in the
EU.

The
Scottish
National
Party and
Scottish
Greens
want
Scotland
to
have
control over
the UK’s
agricultural
funding
after Brexit.

Scottish
first
minister
Nicola
Sturgeon
warned
that postBrexit
immigratio
n
quotas will
not be
sustainable
for
Scotland.

The Royal
Bank of
Scotland
was
considerin
g moving
their
headquarters to
Amsterda
m after
Brexit.

New
Statesman

Farmer’s
Weekly

BBC

The
Guardian

The articles in Table 2 outline the debate well. Sim (2018) writes about the
difficulty deciding which powers post-Brexit should go to the Scottish Parliament as
opposed to the Parliament in London. Certain powers that the European Union has now
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that would have to revert back to the United Kingdom (for example, making trade
agreements and controlling immigration), and the two have been struggling over whether
or not certain powers would be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (Sim, 2018).
Arguments over which powers should be central or devolved have occurred between
Holyrood and Westminster for a while, but the European Union referendum have
increased the prevalence of these (Sim 2018). The Smith piece (2018) is an example of a
power struggle between those two seats of government, specifically it concerns the
Scottish Parliament’s rejection of the Brexit proposal, the proposal for how and why the
United Kingdom would leave the European Union, and what effects that could have on
the United Kingdom’s plan to leave to European Union. Westminster could legally
decide to override that decision and leave the European Union, but that would create
great political tension between the two Parliaments (Smith, 2018).
The Rampen piece (2016) was written following the vote on the European Union
referendum, and it focuses on the economic fallout of Brexit for Scottish businesses,
although it does mention that the majority of poor Scots, like poor Englishmen, voted to
leave the European Union, unlike the general majority of the nation. The Dann piece
(2017) touches on both political tension and economic issues, because it is about how the
Scottish National Party (SNP), the majority party in Scotland, and the Scottish Greens
want post-Brexit agricultural funding for the United Kingdom to be under Scottish
control. This is particularly of interest as the vast majority of farmers in the United
Kingdom are Scottish, and Scotland makes the vast majority of Scottish agricultural
output. The 2020 BBC article talks about Scottish concerns over the United Kingdom
restricting low-skill immigration after Brexit, which will damage the Scottish economy
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because they need those workers for the agricultural industry.
The Treanor piece (2017) discusses the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and looks
into the consequences of the possible movement of their post-Brexit headquarters out of
Scotland. The proposed reason why The Royal Bank of Scotland would leave the United
Kingdom is so that they could maintain a European presence and a business path in
Europe. This article also underscores some of the economic effects of the United
Kingdom leaving the European Union, which is that businesses based in the United
Kingdom will no longer have the same level of access to the European market, which
means that if businesses want the same level of access to the European market that they
had previous to Brexit, they will have to move operations out of the United Kingdom.
Doing so will have a disproportionate effect on small businesses that will not be able to
move their operations overseas but that will no longer have the same easy access to the
European market.
The 2017 BBC article and the 2018 Rahmatian article are very complimentary in
topic, which is ironic since Rahmatian does not present a position that the public debate is
informed enough by academia. The Rahmatian piece not only talks about the institutional
barriers to Scotland being able to leave the United Kingdom and joining the European
Union, but it also mentioned that the xenophobia stirred up in the pre-Brexit arguments in
support of Brexit could be turned against non-English ethnic minorities (Rahmatian 2018).
The 2017 BBC article is about solidarity between Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the
Republic of Ireland against Brexit. While the article does not mention ethnic conflicts
specifically, it does mention border conflicts, which could exacerbate ethnic issues (BBC
2017).
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Other news articles include a 2017 BBC article that talks about how Scottish first
minister aligning herself and Scotland with the Republic of Ireland against Brexit.
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and the Republic of Ireland are against the United Kingdom
leaving, albeit for slightly reasons. They all agree on common issues that Brexit would
bring to their nations, but Scotland’s main issues with the plan are economic, while the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are concerned about closing the border between
them (BBC 2017). Leask (2020) discusses the international security implications that an
independent Scotland could have,
including Scotland’s anti-nuclear stance that could mean that they would remove British
missiles from Scottish soil, which is a concern for NATO.
Reviewing this information informs the likely options for a possible future for
Scotland after Brexit. The academic debate sometimes ponders the future for Scotland,
whereas the public debate tends to focus on current developments. Key takeaways are
that it is unlikely that Scotland would be able to join the European Union, due to several
factors, Euroscepticism is not a large part of modern Scottish political discourse, and that
certain powers currently centralized in the European Parliament would have to return to
the United Kingdom, and Westminster and Holyrood are currently engaged in a power
struggle over certain areas, like agricultural funding and immigration. All of these
takeaways can be extrapolated into three possible futures for Scotland in after Brexit, if
occurs.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
From the literature, there are three possible outcomes, but some are more likely
than others. This section will discuss the outcome, the positives and negatives provided
by the outcome, how likely the outcome is, and what the world would look like should
the outcome come to fruition. These three outcomes are as follows: no Brexit, greater
autonomy within the United Kingdom, and independence from the United Kingdom. As
it stands currently with COVID safety precautions and response detracting from the
energy and debate that would be allocated to Brexit and the fact that there is still
currently no exit deal between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Brexit is
unlikely to occur in the near future. If Brexit does happen, the most likely outcome is that
Scotland will demand greater autonomy; it needs to be noted that while this outcome is
slightly more likely than the third outcome, the emphasis is on slightly. The third and
least likely (but still likely) outcome is that Scotland will secede from the United
Kingdom, either joining the European Union or not.
Fletcher and Zahn give only two options: independence or European Union
membership without independence (2018: 98-99). However, these are not the only two
options, and the option that is the most likely often gets ignored on the assumption that of
course Brexit is going to happen. This assumption, while academically and legally sound,
fails to account for the public debate and the absolute refusal of the Scottish public to go
quietly into that good night with Brexit. It is important for scholars to not only review the
academic debates in situations like this, but also look to non-academic’s positions as they
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are stakeholders in the situation’s outcome as well.
Option One:
The first option is the least dramatic and least fun one to analyze; however, as the
years continue, it is becoming increasingly the most likely. With COVID-19 outcomes
and safety measures dominating much of the news and the fact that the United Kingdom
has failed to present the European Union with an exit bill that has been approved by all of
the regional legislatures, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom will be leaving the
European Union any time soon. Scotland rejected the United Kingdom’s exit bill in 2018
(Smith 2018). The Kingdom continuing to push through a bill rejected by a regional
Parliament would definitely escalate tensions and overall be unproductive and result in
angering the Scottish more than they already have been angry about Brexit (Smith 2018).
The United Kingdom has already exceeded the two- year time limit in Article 50, which
is the E.U. provision that allows a member state to leave the union (Vidmar 2018: 428).
The provision allows for there to be a two-year negotiation period between the European
Union and the leaving member state, and if the two bodies do not come to an agreement
by the end of that period, then that cuts off the member state from the European Union
entirely without any relationship with the union (Vidmar 2018: 428). The European did
vote to extend this two-year period, but if they were willing to do it once, they might be
willing to keep extending the deadline.
With this option, the benefits are that the United Kingdom and all its nations can
avoid the economic devastation that would come from not being able to have the same
access to the European market. No businesses would have to leave, and low-skill
immigrants could still have access to the Scotland, thus providing agricultural labor that
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powers Scotland’s large agricultural economy. Another positive will be that this will
hopefully not exacerbate the ethnic tensions between the Scots and British, like
Rahmatian (2018) suggests might happen after Brexit.
Another benefit to this future for Scotland is that the E.U. referendum and Brexit
negotiations have exacerbated previously existing tensions in the United Kingdom,
mainly xenophobia and the power struggles between Westminster and the regional
Parliaments. If Brexit did not happen, that would lessen a lot of those tensions, although
there is an argument to be made that they will not simply go away, only lurk under the
surface of public discourse for a few years only to reappear later. The United Kingdom,
which does not have a very revolutionary political culture, does not do very well with
change, and while other states might even encourage tensions to rise in order to affect
change, that is generally not how the United Kingdom prefers to operate. If they have the
choice to opt out of Brexit altogether, they might take it.
As previously stated, this option may be ignored because it is not very dramatic,
and the academic debate takes for granted that following the referendum is what the
government would actually enact. Since the European Union referendum is non-binding,
the decision to leave is largely built on misleading or inaccurate statistics and
xenophobia. Both Northern Ireland and Scotland are united in their view on leaving the
European Union, even citing the same reasons publicly (BBC 2017). The Scottish
government refuses to entertain the notion of leaving the European Union, and while
Westminster could overrule Holyrood, it would create negative optics and probably cause
more problems than it would solve.
One negative aspect of this option is that the xenophobic sentiment that was used
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to make pro-Brexit arguments in the lead up to the referendum vote could either go away
(which is a desirable outcome), or be suppressed so long that they inevitably rise to the
surface of public discourse in an equally or perhaps even more destructive vote or
decision down the road. Nationalist identities have been growing in the United Kingdom
for years, and the English are starting to get exacerbated by what they feel are
unnecessary regional identities (White and Barnett 2018: 591). The English sometimes
confuse the nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as ethnic
nationalist movements, when in reality they are more similar to civic nationalism, and
this is especially true of Scottish nationalism (White and Barnett 2018: 592).
Another negative aspect of this option is that it could be perceived as subverting
democracy. To better illustrate the issues of democratic subversion. The SNP originally
proposed that the vote not be a simple majority, but in order for the United Kingdom to
actually leave the European Union, all four nations would have to all have a majority
“leave” vote in order for the United Kingdom to trigger Article 50 (Vidmar 2018: 440).
Since all four nations would have to leave the European Union together, there probably
should have been four different votes instead of the one referendum for the whole state,
and it would be an easy argument to make that a decision that requires a majority vote
from all four nations of the United Kingdom is democratic. The argument about the
democracy of this option can be found in the academic literature, literature that seems to
take for granted the idea that the U.K. would in fact leave the E.U. Yet the public debate
was not nearly as settled, and news coverage portrays the issue as if it is an ongoing
struggle rather than an inevitability.
Just because something legally or constitutionally should or could happen, does
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not guarantee that it will, even in a democracy. This is simply because there is more to
democracy than voting. For example, authoritarian states will hold “elections” because
they are an easy tool to give the regime a veneer of legitimacy and democratic aesthetics.
Democracy is not just following the results of an election. While elections are supposed
to be indicators of public opinion, what should happen if the calculated public opinion is
not accurately represented in the election results? This is especially complicated because
of the misinformation that preceded the E.U. referendum coming from the “leave”
campaign. This begs the question as to what is even is the most democratic action to take
in this situation? The simple answer is to follow the referendum, but then the question is
about how democratic is it to override the wants of not only the Scottish but Irish people
as well? How is a referendum truly democratic when one side of the campaign spread
blatant misinformation as their argument to leave the European Union? If the people were
deliberately misled into believing one thing, can that really be considered a democratic
decision? Democracy, especially in this case, is very complicated and academics do
themselves a disservice when they try to simplify it by only analyzing constitutional law
and institutional power. The widespread sentiment against Brexit in Scotland makes it
harder to argue that leaving the European Union would be completely democratic, but
since England and Wales voted to leave, staying would be going against their democratic
wants. In fact, before the official Brexit referendum, the Scottish National Party (SNP)
proposed that the vote should be “a U.K.-wide majoritarian vote that would require
support in all four constitutive countries: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland” (Vidmar 2018: 440). It’s a difficult situation, and while most academics
understand that it is complex from an institutional or constitutional perspective, since
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most academics barely mention the public debate, they tend to ignore the complexity of
the public opinion and informal democracy.
Option Two
The second option is the most likely to occur if the United Kingdom does indeed
leave the European Union. Still, this is not as likely as Brexit may simply not happen in
the foreseeable future. This option is that Scotland gains powers that were previously
under the purview of the European Union, like immigration, economic spending, trade
policy with certain Scottish industries, thus gaining greater autonomy even while
remaining in the United Kingdom.
The reason why staying and gaining greater autonomy is more likely than leaving
the United Kingdom is that scholars are unclear whether or not Scotland could
technically join the European Union, as there is no precedent for that in the history of the
EU. This is one of the reasons why the Scotland chose to stay in the United Kingdom in
the 2014 referendum, and the main motivator for Scotland to leave the U.K. after Brexit
would be for Scotland to join the E.U.
Even though Scotland probably can’t join the European Union while remaining in
the U.K., Scottish politicians and political parties still use the threat of secession as a tool
in negotiations with Westminster. There have been calls to hold another independence
vote if the U.K. actually passes a Brexit bill through the E.U. Parliament. Leaving the
E.U. would send shockwaves through every part of British society and be a destabilizing
force. On top of that, the threat of Scottish secession would further destabilize the state,
which is something the United Kingdom wants to avoid.
Scotland’s access to greater autonomy could have several various outcomes. It
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could mean that Scotland has a few powers that the European Union currently has over
the United Kingdom, or it could mean that Scotland is given almost complete autonomy
on their economic and diplomatic relations with the E.U. Scottish politicians already want
all control over the United Kingdom’s agricultural funding after Brexit to go to Scotland
(Dann 2017). Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon has already expressed that
Westminster’s post-Brexit immigration is inadequate to suit Scotland’s economic needs
(BBC 2020).
Any Brexit negotiations will have enormous implications for Scottish trade with
the EU, drastically impacting the Scottish economy. Trade within the EU is relatively
easy because the states have agreed-upon trade guidelines, but trading with the EU as a
non-member state can be more difficult. The Scots want greater autonomy in negotiations
with the EU in general, but they cannot negotiate directly with the EU because the UK is
a unitary government, and the devolved powers at the national level do not have unique
powers that supersede the powers of the unitary central government (Fletcher and Zahn
2017: 100).
In a sense, the fate of the Scottish economy is under the jurisdiction of the UK
government and the Scottish Parliament does not have any autonomy in negotiating with
the EU. Utilizing a threat such as secession to influence the Brexit negotiations and the
trade negotiations pertaining to Brexit in particular could grant Scotland at least some
control over their future situation. It could work to pressure the British Parliament, and
the Scottish National Party has seats in the British Parliament to aide in pressuring that
entity.
The positive effects to gaining greater autonomy are that Scotland could sidestep
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some of the economic fallout of leaving the European Union, negotiate directly with the
European Union, and perhaps satisfy Scottish civic nationalism for a little while. It might
not be enough to satisfy the Scottish nationalist movement long term but depending on
the amount of autonomy that Scotland is able to negotiate from Westminster, it could be
enough for a while. By being able to negotiate directly about trade with the European
Union, Scotland will be able to control the economic fallout of Brexit, thus being able to
mitigate the damage that Brexit could do to the Scottish economy. As it stands right now,
Westminster and Westminster alone have complete control over all Brexit negotiations,
which is part of the tension between Holyrood and Westminster.
The negative implications of this option fit into two categories: the negatives of
threatening secession in order to achieve greater autonomy, and the negatives of having
to leave the European Union. Threatening secession may be the best solution for
Scotland, but there are some negatives that would complicate using the threat of
secession. The Scottish Parliament would have to time this well, because if they
threatened to hold an independence referendum too early, then they will take themselves
away from the table without having acquired a favorable deal for Scotland. On the other
hand, if they only threaten such a referendum for too long without a follow-through, then
the threat will lose its potency. The threat only works if the UK government believes that
Scotland could feasibly believe that Scotland could actually secede.
While the UK government could take the threat seriously, they could also
perceive it to be political grandstanding on the part of the Scottish and ignore it. The only
way that the threat could work as a negotiation tool is if the UK sees the threat as
legitimate. If the UK perceives the threat as illegitimate, then there is no incentive for
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them to bow to any demands made on behalf of the Scottish people. The Scottish
Parliament must make it clear to the British Parliament that the former entity has every
intention of seceding should the threat not be taken seriously. Then, if Scotland secedes
after the British Parliament continues to ignore their demands, then the Scots have both
lost their negotiating power and have angered a global power for the possibility that it
might join the EU in the future.
Unfortunately, this future necessitates that Scotland leave the European Union
permanently. One of the major reasons to vote to stay in the United Kingdom in the 2014
Scottish independence referendum was that leaving the U.K would mean leaving the E.U.
Scottish nationalism is not Eurosceptic, and actually Scottish national identity includes a
close relationship with the European continent, and some have argued that part of
Scottish national identity historically is having close cultural ties with the continent of
Europe. Also, even greater autonomy from the United Kingdom is not going to satisfy
Scottish nationalists for long. If Scotland remains in the United Kingdom, it will likely
leave the E.U. and with no option to rejoin. If, however, Scotland secedes from the
United Kingdom, it may or may not be able to join the European Union.
It is unclear whether greater autonomy will impact the xenophobia that some are
worried that the Scots will get. There’s an astonishing lack of understanding by
Englishmen of the nature of Scottish nationalism, with some thinking that anyone not
ethnically Scottish will be thrown out of the nation, when that is not what Scottish
nationalism is at all (White and Barnett 2018: 591). Additionally, nationalist movements
in Wales and Northern Ireland exist, and the result could be that people in England who
misunderstand Scottish nationalism use it as an excuse for ethnic nationalism or
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xenophobia.
The occurrence of this scenario is slightly more likely than independence. In
conclusion, Scotland could use the threat of secession as a tool to obtain greater
autonomy from the United Kingdom. It is unclear whether this will satisfy Scottish
nationalism or not, and it is also unclear whether or not it will have any effect on possible
xenophobia towards Scots. This option also necessitates leaving the European Union,
whereas other options do not, and ultimately, the main goal of Scotland is not to leave the
European Union.
Option Three
The third and least likely option is Scottish independence. This is not only the
least likely result as it would require Brexit to actually happen, and because greater
autonomy seems to be more feasible than independence. However, it has its advantages
just like the others, and is the most drastic solution, and definitely the solution that is that
Scottish politicians posture as if this is the one that they’ll choose. Posturing for
independence aides any attempts that they want to gain greater autonomy, since the
United Kingdom has a vested interest in keeping Scotland part of the United Kingdom.
There are many positives to this option; this option, unlike the previous one, at
least allows for the possibility, albeit a slim possibility, that Scotland could join the
European Union. If this occurred, the long-term economic fallout of leaving the E.U.
would be avoided, although Scotland would have to exist outside of the E.U. in an
interim period before they were accepted. Even so, they would be able to directly
negotiate with E.U. themselves, as opposed to only being able to approve of what
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Westminster negotiates. Scottish politicians are lobbying for greater autonomy to
negotiate directly with the European Union, if, however, Scotland gains independence, it
will be able to unilaterally set its own terms in the interim between leaving the United
Kingdom and joining the European Union. This is preferable to the current arrangement
of Westminster making deals with the European Union when Scotland does not even
want to leave the European Union in the first place. Being forced to leave the European
Union and being prevented to mitigate the damage that will be done to Scotland is the
main reason why Scottish politicians are threatening to hold a second independence
referendum the moment that something happens in Brexit that is unfavorable to Scotland.
The main reason likely resulting in Scotland’s secession from the United
Kingdom would be in order to join the E.U. The academic debaters do not have a
consensus on whether Scotland would actually be able to this, since there is no precedent
for a former region of a member state joining the European Union. With or without
secession, “an independent Scotland would be the clearest legal route to membership of
the EU should the UK leave, although by no means guaranteed,” nonetheless at least
Scotland could legally be able to apply to join to E.U., whereas it could not join as only a
region of the United Kingdom (Fletcher and Zahn 2017: 95). With this option, Scotland
has an opportunity to rejoin the United Kingdom, whereas the chances are much slimmer
should they try to lobby for greater autonomy.
Scotland would probably have the support of Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland, considering the 2017 BBC article, which states those three nations’ united
front against Brexit, for various reasons. The main reason why this is improbable is the
United Kingdom’s interest remains to block Scotland from seceding. Not only are there
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historical ties between all of the nations and England, but since Northern Ireland is also
against Brexit, there could be worries that independence for Scotland would embolden
Irish separatist movements. Northern Ireland’s fate is a little more complicated in some
ways than Scotland, because if they leave the United Kingdom, they have the option of
either joining an existing state or creating their own; however, if they wish to remain in
the European Union, they should join the Republic of Ireland since it is an E.U. member
state. There is a Welsh separatist movement and political party, but since Wales voted
originally to leave the European Union, then Scottish secession based on European Union
membership may not sway them, but they could be persuaded by Scotland’s example of
independence in general. In short, Scotland’s secession could cause a domino effect of
separation, and as such the United Kingdom would try to prevent Scottish secession.
An obstacle to this option is that Scotland would have to negotiate with the United
Kingdom directly, and secession will understandably make those relations very tense.
Unlike Wales, or Northern Ireland should they choose to secede, Scotland shares a land
border with England, and since neither state will be an E.U. member state, they will have
to enforce a border there, which could lead to political violence. It could also just generally
be difficult to negotiate with a power that one just seceded from; it took the United States
and the British Empire a while before they were on good diplomatic terms. Part of this very
struggle is seen in Brexit negotiations now; the European Union is not happy that the
United Kingdom is leaving the union, and that is making negotiations very difficult
between the two Parliaments. With the history between England and Scotland, there is the
potential for the negotiations to escalate tensions between those two powers.
The other main obstacle to this future is that it is not guaranteed that Scotland will
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be able to join the European Union after secession. There is no precedent for a former
region of a European Union member state rejoining the European Union, and even if
Scotland could rejoin the European Union, it could take years. The literature is
inconclusive about how feasible this is; if pressed to draw a conclusion, it is cautiously
optimistic. The problem is that the main factor for secession would be for European
Union membership, which option two does not allow for and remaining in the European
Union is currently a primary goal for the Scottish Parliament, politicians, parties, and first
minister. If Scotland were to secede and were not able to procure E.U. membership, then
they would have potentially escalated tensions between England and Scotland, possibly
inspired secessionist movements in Northern Ireland and maybe Wales, still have to deal
with the economic repercussions of leaving the European Union, all to end up
permanently outside of the European Union anyways. It has a higher reward than the
second option, because Scotland finally gets independence and possibly European Union,
but it also has a higher risk in that Scotland will have to go through a lot in order to only
maybe be able to join the European Union.
A positive aspect of this future is that since Scotland has already formed a
positive relationship with the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (BBC 2017), so
they might have allies in their independence efforts. Seceding from the United Kingdom
to join the European Union might make it easier for them to negotiate with the European
Union before Scotland is admitted into the E.U. and also ingratiate Scotland with the
European Union, making the E.U. amenable to negotiating with Scotland. Scotland is
going to need allies when they secede, as diplomatic recognition and established allies are
vital for new states. If the Scotland has the support of Northern Ireland, E.U. member
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state the Republic of Ireland, and even a few E.U. member states, that would ease their
transition into an independent state. Secession is a difficult process, especially when the
newly independent state is seceding from a regional or global power like the United
Kingdom. The state that the new state is leaving does not even have to be powerful
themselves, as long as they have powerful allies, other states will be hesitant to recognize
the new state. Historical examples of states that have had difficulty receiving diplomatic
recognition because of either the power of the state that their trying to secede from, or
their allies are Taiwan (because of the People’s Republic of China) and the Western
Sahara or Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (because of the United States’ and other
powerful states’ support for Morocco). Part of the reason why the Kurds still do not have
a Kurdish state, despite it being promised to them after World War I, is because in order
to officially establish Kurdistan, the Kurds would have to secede from not one, but four
states, and they lack a lot of strong international allies.
However, if Scotland cannot get allies to recognize it and risk angering the United
Kingdom, that could really hinder the Scottish economy and their ability to have
diplomatic and trade relations with other states. It could also be an international security
risk for Scotland to not have any allies, since they would be left out of diplomatic
meetings about international security. They may or may not be able to join NATO, and
they may or may not be able to join other IGOs. If Scotland is allowed into the European
Union, it will probably make it easier for them to join other IGOs, and since the United
Kingdom will not be a member of the European Union and Brexit negotiations have
soured relations between the E.U. and the U.K., the United Kingdom will not be able to
do much to prevent Scotland from joining the European Union. There is a possibility that
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if Scotland is able to join the E.U., their membership will be able to legitimize them
enough to make their membership into other IGOs and diplomatic circles easier, but it is
not guaranteed that Scotland would be able to join the European Union.
In light of security risks, there are British nuclear submarines that are currently
based near Glasgow, but Scotland has vowed to not be a nuclear state despite also
wanting membership in NATO, which highly prioritizes those nuclear weapons (Leask
2020: 14). There is also international concern that Scotland will not align with the United
Kingdom on certain future foreign policy decisions; Leask mentions concerns about
Scottish decisions over Libya and Iraq specifically, but this concern is not limited to
those areas (Leask 2020: 17). If Scotland wants to remove the nuclear-armed submarines
from their territorial waters, then NATO would have a problem with that, possibly
jeopardizing Scotland’s ability to join NATO. Since NATO’s main concern is that those
submarines are the United Kingdom’s only nuclear deterrent, according to Leask (2020),
that raises the question of why those submarines have to be stationed off of the coast of
Scotland and they absolutely cannot be moved to the south, off the coast of England.
In summary, Scottish independence has many benefits, the chief of which is that
Scotland could be able to join the European Union, and that they might already have
allies, which they would need in order to secede from a power like the United Kingdom.
Some of the obstacles are the difficulties of secession, and the international security and
diplomatic risks that Scotland might face as a result of leaving the United Kingdom,
especially in the interim period before they can join the European Union. While most
scholars are cautiously optimistic Scotland’s ability to join the E.U., it will still take some
time before they are accepted into the union. During this time, there will be a struggle to
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establish alliances, although they might already have an ally in the Republic of Ireland in
particular. The United Kingdom also has a vested interest in not allowing Scotland to
secede, which is another obstacle to this option. The separatist movements that have been
steadily expanding in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The reason why this is
option is the least likely is that although it has the opportunity to provide Scotland with
what it wants: a Scottish state and E.U. membership, it also has obstacles are great and
the E.U. membership might not even happen. The first future does not have much of
these obstacles, while still allowing Scotland to have European Union membership. The
second one, while it does require Scotland to leave the E.U., would allow for Scotland to
negotiate directly with the European Union on their own terms, instead of London
negotiating for Scotland. This is still a likely future for Scotland.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the academic and public debates can inform what the possible
futures for Scotland could be, and from these possibilities, the community can plan for
each possible outcome. These three futures are not the only ones that are possible: Brexit
could happen without giving Scotland greater autonomy, Scotland may not be able to join
the E.U., there could be another Brexit referendum that has a different result, etc.
However, based on the literature, the options outlined of no Brexit, greater Scottish
autonomy, and Scottish independence are the most likely futures for Scotland. There are
many benefits and obstacles for each of these futures.
Key takeaways from this thesis are that no matter what happens, Scotland will
continue to be in a difficult position, and that a significant number of problems have been
and continue to be caused by tensions between England and Scotland. An underlying
problem in Scottish politics is that they are not allowed full autonomy under a British
unitary government, and decisions like Brexit only exacerbate the sentiment that Scotland
is being ignored. Brexit could be interpreted to feed the narrative that Scotland is being
forced into actions that Scotland does not want to take. This is Scottish politicians
rejected the United Kingdom’s E.U. withdrawal bill, because they do not want to be
forced to follow a course of actions that Scotland voted against following (Smith 2018).
Another key reflection is the need to not have research that is too niche, as that can result
in disparate topics. What appears to have happened is that the academic authors chose
specialized topics after Brexit, and then much of the research by consequence was highly
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specific. Many articles include general information on Brexit, so a general audience
reader would have some idea of what they are talking about, but the specialization makes
it difficult to ascertain a consensus. When Rahmatian (2018) says that the academic
debate outside of constitutional law is absent from the public debate, one wonders if that
might be a result of the specialization making it difficult to apply lessons from the
academic debate to the public one. Also, as pointed out in the literature review, there is a
news article about immigration, not constitutional law, that agrees with Rahmatian.
There are many areas for further research in this field; there is a need for metaanalyses and large literature reviews because the academic literature especially varies
wildly by subtopic. This is also not meant to be an analysis about the United Kingdom as
a whole; all of these futures have implications for the other nations in the United
Kingdom that was not discussed in as great of detail as it could have been. This could be
a plan for future research. Comprehensive opinion polling of the Scottish public could
also be a plan for any future research.
This is research is important because it attempts to collect information from
academic and news sources and apply that information to discern what Scotland’s future
might be after Brexit. Scotland, as the home of a significant portion of the U.K.’s
agricultural economy, is important to study for economic reasons. Scotland is also
important to study because if Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom, that might
embolden at least Northern Ireland, if not Wales as well. There are also international
security implications of an independent Scottish state.
I must admit that my research has some limitations. First, I was not able to do
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opinion polling on my own, so I do not have my own data on some of these issues.
Secondly, this did not have as extensive a literature analysis as I would have liked to have
done, which was mostly a result of time restraints on my part. The public debate also
shifted away from Brexit a little and towards the COVID-19 response in the United
Kingdom.
However, the importance of research like this is that it can help prepare the
international community for seismic shifts, like Brexit and possible Scottish secession. If
research like this continued, the academic community, as well as possibly the public,
would be able to anticipate the consequences of certain actions. The community would be
able to engage in a better-informed general debate, instead of many people looking at
small niche areas of research under this same topic with nothing to guide the discussion.
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